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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ten lease, only five days' notice to vacate is necessary, in order
to maintain summary ejectment proceedings. The court applied
the first paragraph of Revised Statutes Section 2155 as amended'0
and said that the ten and thirty day notice provisions of the
second paragraph of that section are inapplicable.
The comments on this statute had generally taken a con-
trary view," but there was no judicial authority on the subject.
Lower courts and practicing attorneys should welcome the defini-
tive ruling on this problem.
IV. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS
Tort Liability of the State
The state's immunity from tort liability is limited only by
the requirement of our constitution that "private property shall
not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after
just and adequate compensation is paid."' Somewhat similar
provisions appear in most of the state constitutions. However,
the prohibition is generally directed only at the taking of prop-
erty and is limited to appropriational harms.
The provision in the Louisiana constitution that compensa-
tion must likewise be paid for damage to private property opens
the way for an expansion of state liability which may result in
trimming down the traditional immunity of the sovereign. A
substantial body of law had been developed in Louisiana which
perhaps pointed in this direction. Damages for injury inadver-
tently inflicted during the course of public improvement work
had been recovered in several decisions: 2 In all these cases, how-
ever, the injury followed from affirmative conduct of the state's
agents in making public improvements on land, and usually the
damage merely represented extended compensation for an in-
10. See La. Act 200 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§6597-66011.
11. Compare Comment (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 161, and Comment
(1946) 21 Tulane L. Rev. 256.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2.
2. Green v. Board of Com'rs of Lake Borgne Basin Levee Dist., 163 La.
117, 111 So. 619 (1927); De Moss v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83,
118 So. 700 (1928); Nagle v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 175 La. 704, 144 So.
425 (1932).
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terest which the state had deliberately seized under its power
of expropriation.
The first instance in which a plaintiff sought to hold the state
for consequential damages arising from an activity not connected
with land improvement was the recent case, Angelle v. State.'
During the course of spraying plaintiff's potatoes for weevils,
agents for the Department of Agriculture carelessly allowed a
fire to start. The flames destroyed plaintiff's potatoes. His claim
for damages under Article 1, Section 2, of the constitution was
rejected. The court felt constrained to repudiate several of its
previous decisions, particularly De Moss v. Police Jury4 and
Nagle v. Police Jury.5 It announced the rule that recovery for
damaged property will be allowed only where the damaging is
"intentional or occurs as a necessary consequence of the public
undertaking."
Sovereign immunity from tort liability is a conception that
rests entirely upon the bare fiction that "the king can do no
wrong" and, as has been indicated many times,6 it has no founda-
tion in either good morals or good economy. It thus appears that
in Angelle v. State the court went out of its way to upset a liberal
tradition developing in this jurisdiction. Under the previous rule
the state and its subdivisions were liable for all damages "proxi-
mately caused" by the making of public improvements. The new
rule makes them liable for all damages that are "necessary con-
sequences" of the improvements. Perhaps the substitution of one
unknown for another only marks the difference between Twee-
dledum and Tweedledee. If so, the act of muddying the water
seems all the more unnecessary. On the other hand, if (as seems
likely) the court means to eliminate all liability for purely neg-
ligent depredation, it has discarded a thoroughly acceptable in-
strument for whittling away at the indefensible immunity of the
sovereign.
Negligence-Standards of Care
In earlier issues of this symposium the present writer has
commented upon the fact that persons who deal in gas and other
dangerous substances are likely to be held to so high a degree of
3. 212 La. 1069, 34 So. (2d) 321 (1948).
4. 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1928).
5. 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932).
6. Fordham and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in
Louisiana (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 720; Borchard, Government Liability
in Tort (1924) 34 Yale L. J. 1.
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care that for practical purposes they may be regarded as insur-
ers against damage.7 Res ipsa loquitur is used freely in these
cases to relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of proving the
details of negligence, because negligence is not a serious issue.8
This observation is again affirmed in Plunknett v. United
Electric Service.9 The plaintiff's dwelling was destroyed by fire
which, according to his claim, originated in a gas heating system
the defendant' had installed two days earlier. Although the case
was discussed by the court in terms of res ipsa loquitur and
recovery was granted through the application of that doctrine,
there was sufficient affirmative evidence to raise a persuasive
inference of negligence in support of the judgment. Believable
testimony showed that the fire originated around the heating
unit and that no one had altered the condition of the heater after
defendant completed the installation. No more was needed to
justify the decision.
The use of res ipsa loquitur complicated the task of the
court, for it enabled the defendant to interject a typical limita-
tion on that doctrine. He contended that res ipsa loquitur does
not apply unless the instrumentality allegedly causing the acci-
dent was at the time in the exclusive possession and control of
defendant. This contention was properly rejected as inapplicable
to the facts of the case. The court pointed to Motor Sales and
Service, Incorporated v. Grasselli Chemical Company' ° and to
the numerous cases in Louisiana in which recovery has been
allowed against bottlers for damages caused by injurious sub-
stances in beverages or by exploding bottles. In none of these
cases was the instrumentality within the control of the defendant
at the time of the accident."
The Plunknett case reached a fair and sensible conclusion;
but the writer again takes the liberty of asking, why complicate
a simple case of circumstantial proof by treating it as though it
were different from other cases? Why must it be said that such
7. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAW
ReviEw 601; (1947) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 246, 250; (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 248, 250.
8. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of
the Louisiana Cases (1941) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 70, 90, and cases cited
therein.
9. 36 So. (2d) 704 '(La. 1948).
10. 15 La. App. 353, 131 So. 623 (1930). See the comment on this case in
(1933) 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 519, 530.
11. These cases are collected in Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof
by Inference (1941) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 70, 81, 98. The only serious points
of dispute in such controversies are whether the foreign substance was in
the bottle before it was opened and whether the alleged damage was genuine.
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a case requires the use of some special Latin doctrine to save
the plaintiff from defeat? It is enough to observe that those who
install gas heaters must do the job in such a way as to avoid
an imminent hazard of fire,12 and if the installation does cause
fire the installers are liable for the resulting damage. To this
simple observation the court need only add that the plaintiff
has shown by satisfactory proof that the heater as installed by
the defendant was probably the source of the fire. What more
is necessary? Cases are proved by probabilities.
The supreme court recently indicated its willingness to im-
pose what virtually amounts to absolute liability upon the opera-
tors of vessels for injuries occasioned by swells.18 Defendant,
Higgins Industries, was operating a towboat and a barge upon
the waters of the Tickfaw River, which is well known as a resort
for fishing with small craft. Plaintiff's decedent and a friend were
in a fourteen foot skiff which was swamped by swells produced
by defendant's vessel, and as a result decedent was drowned. The
judgment of the trial court awarding damages of $26,500.00 was
sustained, although the amount was reduced to $19,000.00. The
alleged negligence was a failure to keep a watchout for small
vessels. Said the court, "A duty rests upon vessels not to travel
upon navigable waters in such a manner as to produce displace-
ment waves that will cause injury to other properly handled
craft." The duty, when so framed, expresses almost an insurer's
liability. As in the case of other ultrahazardous agencies, the
court suggested that the burden rests upon defendant to exone-
rate itself by showing the injury was not avoidable.
Negligence-Proof
An excellent illustration of proof by inference or circum-
stance is afforded in Davis v. Home Lumber Company. 4 De-
fendant's factory had been operating for a long time without
12. The term, negligence, can be used to express all conceivable exac-
tions upon the defendant. The physician is free from negligence if his col-
leagues will testify that he conformed to their version of the prevailing
medical practice in the locality. It is interesting to contrast this with the
unyielding standard required of those who deal with electricity:
"The fact that frequent inspections of the line were made to ascertain
the condition of the wires and remedy defective insulation does not re-
lieve the company of liability. If the span wire had become dangerously
charged with the electrical current the company's inspection should
have been thorough enough to have detected it .... It was its business
to know the span wire in question was a 'live' wire through leakage
from the trolley which it suspended." Whitworth v. South Arkansas
Lbr. Co., 121 La. 894, 899, 46 So. 912, 914 (1908).
13. Tolle v. Higgins Industries, Inc., 212 La. 173, 31 So. (2d) 730 (1947).
14. 213 La. 429, 34 So. (2d) 914 (1948).
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spark arrestors despite warnings of the state fire marshall. The
existence of a fire hazard was made clear by proof that on pre-
vious occasions plaintiff's property had been damaged by sparks
created by this defective condition. Plaintiff showed that on the
occasion in question her house was destroyed by fire during the
night time. She testified that at the time of the fire a strong south-
east wind was blowing toward her property from the direction
of defendant's establishment, carrying with it sparks and embers.
She also affirmed that the fire originated on the shingled roof
of the dwelling, and she eliminated other possible causes, such
as a defective flue or inadequate wiring. The trial court's find-
ing that the fire was caused by the defendant's admittedly negli-
gent operation was affirmed by the supreme court despite the
absence of any eyewitness report of a spark falling upon the roof.
Readers who are interested in the problem of proof of negligence
and causation in cases of this kind will find the earlier case,
Higdon v. W. R. Pickering Lumber Company,15 good reading.
Comer v. Traveler's Insurance Company 6 presents the
simple but sad story of a minister who accidentally ran over
and killed his infant niece while backing his car from the drive-
way of the child's home. The evidence indicated that the child
was standing on the porch with defendant's daughter when de-
fendant entered the car preparatory to leaving. The only issue
was whether or not defendant, knowing the child's fondness for
him, should have anticipated her possible presence behind the
rear wheel of his car. The supreme court found for defendant.
Negligence-Traffic and Transportation
Several years ago the supreme court stated that a motorist
who is favored by a traffic light need not keep a watchout to
determine whether intersecting traffic is proceeding in disregard
of the red signal. 17 More recently in Koob v. Cooperative. Cab
Company18 this same observation was made with reference to
a motorist on a thoroughfare protected by "stop" signs displayed
on intersecting streets. He is entitled to rely upon the fact that
the arbitrary demand of the sign will be obeyed. The driver on
the less favored street cannot discharge his duty merely by
15. 148 La. 504, 87 So. 252 (1921).
16. 213 La. 176, 34 So. (2d) 511 (1948).
17. Kientz v. Charles Dennery, Inc., 209 La. 144, 24 So. (2d) 292 (1945).
This case was discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1945-1946 Term (1947) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 246.
18. 213 La. 903, 35 So. (2d) 849 (1948).
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"reasonably giving way," and those who use a highway protected
by signs can proceed with assurance unless they know, or, from
facts within their knowledge, should know, that a violation is
impending.
Damages
In Matheson v. Placid Oil Company19 defendant trespassed
upon plaintiff's property and drilled for oil. The result was a
dry hole. The supreme court, following the rule in this state,
awarded damages representing the acreage loss of value of the
land for mineral leasing purposes.20 Plaintiff also claimed dam-
ages for surface injuries to his property. This item was allowed
despite defendant's insistence that such damage would not have
been recoverable if a lease had been secured.
Defamation and Malicious Prosecution
In dealing with questions arising from the so-called privilege
of "fair comment" the courts need all possible elbow room. The
formulas in this area of law are therefore purposely loose and
indefinite. Perhaps in strict accuracy "fair comment" is not a
privilege. The term is used to indicate the notion that courts do
not protect a plaintiff's claim to enjoy the favorable opinion of
others.21 The only limits on fair comment are, first, that the opin-
ion must not suggest the existence of supporting facts which are
false and defamatory, and, second, the opinion must not transcend
the bounds of propriety through its vigor and excessiveness.
Within these limits is room for infinite variation, and it is diffi-
cult to insist that any one case should be precedent for another.22
The issue of "fair comment" was discussed at some length
last year in the case, Kennedy v. Item Cornpany.23 Kennedy in-
curred the displeasure of an editor of the New Orleans Item by
challenging the constitutionality of the recently demised Civil
Service Act. The paper printed an editorial that charged in sub-
stance that Kennedy was either incompetent or was intentionally
stirring up vexatious litigation for his own purposes. The editor
suggested as a further alternative that Kennedy hoped to secure
a decision dictated by politics rather than reason. The court
19. 212 La. 807, 33 So. (2d) 527 (1947).
20. Malone, Ruminations on a New Tort: Angelloz v. Humble oil and
Refining Company (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 309 (1942).
21. Green, Relational Interests (iv) (1935) 30 Illinois L. Rev. 314, 333.
22. Id. at 338.
23. 213 La. 347, 34 So. (2d) 886 (1948).
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held that defendant had transcended the limits of fair comment
and assessed damages at $7,500.00.
Although the first two of the editorial charges in question
seem fairly to suggest only the editor's opinion drawn from the
record of the litigation upon which he was commenting, yet it
seems that even here the remarks were more vitriolic and intem-
perate than the legitimate needs of free speech require. The final
charge, that Kennedy may have hoped for a political decision,
seems to this reader to approach an insinuation of fact and passes
beyond mere critical comment upon proceedings of public in-
terest. By thus spitting upon the altar cloth the editor did little
to arouse a sympathetic response from the court.
The case, Eumot v. Railway Express Agency,2 4 decided dur-
ing the last term, demonstrates the almost insurmountable diffi-
culties that beset the path of the plaintiff who seeks to maintain
an action for malicious prosecution. 25 It is not enough that the
defendant instigated a prosecution maliciously, nor is it enough
that there was a lack of probable cause. The plaintiff in such a
suit must establish the concurrence of both elements if he wishes
to recover. In the present case, the damaging prosecution was
for embezzling property in the custody of the defendant express
agency, plaintiff's employer. The facts indicated that the prose-
cution was based upon a signed confession of the plaintiff, to
which was added the affirmative testimony of an alleged receiver
of the embezzled goods. Plaintiff relied on a verdict of "not guil-
ty" in the criminal proceeding and also on his controverted state-
ment that the confession was secured through physical violence.
Recovery was denied. Since the court refused to accept plaintiff's
version that he was beaten or maltreated in order to exact a con-
fession, the case leaves open the question as to what effect should
be given the administration of such treatment if it were estab-
lished. In view of the fact that the integrity of the person is pro-
tected against physical abuse of this kind by the law of assault,
battery and possibly false imprisonment, it seems proper that
such treatment should be considered only as a favoiable circum-
stance along with other factors in a malicious prosecution action.
It should not be conclusive.
24. 36 So. (2d) 30 (La. 1948).
25. Mention may be made here of Iarding v. Operating Co., 212 La. 467,
32 So. (2d) 893 (1947), decided during the present term. Plaintiff sought dam-
ages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The court found
that the evidence did not support the charges. The case is not noteworthy.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Rights of Minor Employees
Prior to this year the situation of the minor employee claim-
ing compensation was precarious indeed. If he was of such age
that his employment was illegal, he was arbitrarily deprived of
the benefit of compensation by the terms of the act.' If he was
under eighteen but was legally employed, he was entitled to
compensation provided that his parents knew of the employ-
ment and had some sort of opportunity to elect for or against
the application of the act. But if he was employed and suffered
injury or death before his parents gained knowledge of his em-
ployment, there was no right to compensation. 2
Both these obstacles to recovery by minors have now been
removed. The illegally employed minor is now entitled to com-
pensation on equal terms with other minor employees by reason
of an amendment to the act in the 1948 session of the legislature.3
This year in Bourgeois v. J. W. Crawford Construction Company4
the supreme court changed the course of the law and held that
although a minor under eighteen years of age cannot make an
expressed or an implied election for or against compensation, yet
there is a presumed election to accept the provisions of the act,
and this presumed election applies indiscriminately to all em-
ployees of all ages. Thus parental knowledge of the employment
is not necessary. As the result of these two innovations all minor
employees are on an equal footing with adults.
In view of the happy conclusion of the court, this writer feels
that only ingratitude or bad taste could prompt criticism of the
gallant steed who has carried his burden to the proper destina-
tion under trying conditions, even though the route chosen was
somewhat tortuous. Requiescat in pace.
Prematurity and Prescription
Several years ago in Thornton v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours
1. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 3, par. 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4393 (6)]. Kennedy
v. Johnson Lumber Co., 33 So. (2d) 558 (La. App. 1947) (employment of minors
under eighteen years in violation of La. Act 210 of 1944 are excluded from
compensation coverage).
2. Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Parham, 279 Fed. 945 (C.C.A. 5th, 1922);
Ballard v. Stroube Drug Co., 10 So. (2d) 532 (La. App. 1942); Melton v.
Fraering Brokerage Co., Inc., 31 So. (2d) 884 (La. App. 1947). Cf. Bourgeois
v. J. W. Crawford Constr. Co., 28 So. (2d) 765 (La. App. 1947).
3. La. 20 of 1914, § 3 (6) as amended by La. Act 179 of 1948. This act
is discussed in Louisiana Legislation of 1948 (1948) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1, 98.
4. 36 So.(2d) 13 (La. 1948).
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and Company5 the supreme court attempted to make a final dis-
position of the problems of prematurity and prescription relative
to the claim of an injured employee who was retained on the
employer's payroll at a wage which exceeded the maximum al-
lowable compensation. This writer accepted the opinion as hold-
ing that the continued payment of wages does not prevent the
running of prescription, irrespective of whether the wage is
earned or unearned. 6
The recent decision, D'Antoni v. Employers" Liability Assur-
ance Corporation,7 contains dicta which invites the suspicion that
this chronic headache is still with us. D'Antoni, an employee of
the State Department of Safety, was injured in the line of duty.
After a brief period of hospitalization, he was returned to light
work at the same wage. His attorney, prompted by the dictates
of the Thornton case, consulted the appropriate official of the
department and apparently requested that compensation pay-
ments be made, or that part of the wage be formally designated
as compensation payment, and that the extent of the disability
be agreed to. This official replied that he could not make a com-
mitment as to compensation and that such a matter must be set-
tled by the courts. He did indicate, however, that he wanted
claimant to receive "his just dues."
When D'Antoni instituted suit to prevent loss of his claim by
prescription, his employer entered a plea of prematurity. The
court of appeal conceded that under the Thornton case the con-
tinued payment of .wage did not amount to a payment of com-
pensation. It found, however, that as a matter of fact there was
no refusal by defendant to meet the compensation demand of
his employee. Accordingly it sustained defendant's plea., Never-
theless, as plaintiff pointed out, there was a refusal to admit
compensation liability without a court adjudication and there
was a refusal to make any concession as to the extent of liability.
Since the payment of wage did not meet the compensation ob-
ligation of defendant, the latter was in default, and it seems
clear that plaintiff was entitled to maintain suit to prevent the
loss of his claim through prescription. The supreme court so held,
and remanded the case.
5. 207 La. 239, 21 So. (2d) 46 (1944).
6. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1944-45 Term-
Workmen's Compensation (1946) 6 LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 607, 608.
7. 213 La. 67, 34 So. (2d) 378 (1948).
8. D'Antoni v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 28 So. (2d) 408 (La.
App. 1946).
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One statement in the D'Antoni opinion has given this writer.
considerable concern. The court interpreted its previous opinion
in the Thornton case as follows:
"If the employee is actually earning the wages paid him,
his suit cannot be dismissed on a plea of prematurity for as
much as he is not receiving compensation .. .conversely, if
it is shown on the i rial of the plea that the wages being paid
the employee are i a reality a gratuity and not for the per-
formance of work, then the action will be dismissed as pre-
mature-for, in such instance, the payment of the wage is
the equivalent to the payment of compensation. 9
The facts in the Thornton case clearly showed that the wage
received by the employee after injury was bestowed in large
part, at least, as a gratuity. The same was true in the D'Antoni
case as was shown by the plaintiff's own unequivocal admission
in Article 14 of his petition. If the rule is as the court declared
it in the quotation above, the petition should have been dismissed
as premature in both cases.
This writer suggests that both the Thornton and the DAn-
toni cases were properly decided, and that the above statement
in the D'Antoni case represents a misconception of the rule of
Thornton's case. As I understand the latter decision, prescription
runs unless compensation is paid as such, and the payment of
neither earned nor unearned wage can entitle the employer to
maintain a plea of prematurity. Any other rule would force the
claimant to speculate helplessly as to whether the wage received
is in whole or in part a gratuity. He will not want to institute
suit only to have his claim dismissed as premature and perhaps
to find himself dismissed by his employer for stirring up trouble.
Procedure
The traditional attitude of liberality toward the plaintiff's
petition in a suit for compensation was shown again during the
last term in the case, Reagor v. First National Life Insurance
Company.10 Plaintiff, a solicitor for defendant insurance com-
pany, fell and injured himself while performing his duties on
foot. He sought to show that his occupation was hazardous by
alleging that he was regularly exposed to motor vehicle traffic
in the street. This contention was dismissed by the court of ap-
9. 213 La. 67, 34 So.(2d) 378, 381 (1948).
10. 212 La. 789, 33 So.(2d) 521 (1948).
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peal," and the holding in this respect was affirmed by the
supreme court.
However, the plaintiff offered to amend by showing addi-
tional facts. Presumably he proposed to allege that his duties
sometimes required that he operate or ride in motor vehicles, and
he sought to bring his situation within the doctrine of cases such
as Collins v. Spielman.12 The court of appeal's refusal to allow
this amendment was regarded as error by the supreme court
and the case was remanded.
V. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Alvin B. Rubin*
In Sherer v. State' the court held that certificates of indebt-
edness of the Public Service Commission were not negotiable
instruments. Plaintiff sought to recover on certain lost certifi-
cates. The state defended on the basis of potential claims by
third persons who might show up with the certificates. Under
Article 2644 of the Civil Code, payment to the original owner of
a non-negotiable instrument would bar action by any transferee,
and the court ordered payment by the state.
VI. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon**
Jurisdiction Ratione Personae
An important question of venue was decided for the first
time during the past year.' On the theory that all members of
a partnership are liable either jointly or in solido for its debts,
plaintiff sued defendant partnership, which was domiciled in
Jefferson Parish, and all of its alleged partners in Orleans Parish,
the domicile of one alleged partner.2  Two of the individual
defendants excepted to the jurisdiction ratione personae of the
11. Reagor v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 28 So.(2d) 527 (La. App. 1947).
12. 200 La. 586, 8 So.(2d) 608 (1942).
* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University;
member, Baton Rouge bar.
1. 213 La. 728, 35 So. (2d) 591 (1948).
**Professor of. Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Rheuark v. Terminal Mud & Chemical Co., 213 La. 732, 35 So. (2d)
592 (1948).
2. Under Art. 165 (6), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by
La. Act 282 of 1940.
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